Plain Talk for the Natives
Having received due permission from the Americans, the Vicar of Downing Street's humanitarian violence spokesman today gave the Foreign Press Association some clear indications about reductions in the number of British troops implicated in the ongoing war crime in Iraq. However, we do not intend to "cut and run". That would be the act of a petty criminal - a cutpurse, a pickpocket or perhaps a Muslim with a very small scimitar - and Britain is none of those things. "Our commitment to Iraq and its people is unchanged and we have made significant progress".
The minister for insurgency provocation went on, "I have already made plain the conditions under which we will hand over to the Iraqi government and security forces." Because the conditions were so plain, tonight he "set out in specific terms what those conditions are" and also "how Iraq will look when they are met." There is "confusion" on the issue, apparently. Not everyone can imagine paradise just like that.
The first condition is: "we need to see a manageable level of threat from insurgents, be they criminal or political." There was no threat from insurgents before the invasion; thirty-five months after the invasion the threat from insurgents is not manageable; and we have made significant progress.
The second condition is: "the Iraqi security forces must be more able to deal with this threat themselves". More able; now that's what I call specific - relatively speaking, of course.
The third condition is: "local government bodies need to be effective, while central government supports them", perhaps via the highly efficient infrastructure which the coalition destroyed and which the Americans recently gave up the pretence of trying to rebuild.
Finally, and most importantly, "we, ourselves, must be confident that we can provide support and backup to local forces if needed." In determining just how confident we, ourselves, have become, the views of the independent, sovereign Iraqi government will no doubt be taken into account. After all, "Our purpose has been to give Iraqis the tools to build the kind of nation they want", within reasonable limits, of course. "Our purpose in Iraq has never been to create a mirror-image of our own nation. That would never work," in fact it isn't working now, even in our own nation; and anyway, "it is not what Iraqis want". Iraqis' wants are easily comprehensible and, mirabile dictu, they are just the same as our wants: "we well understand their desire for us to leave just as soon as the conditions are right. We want that, too."
Still, the minister for armoured democratisation was forced to admit that Iraq would never "look like a western European country"; which is very likely true. There is, for example, "a different attitude to authority and allegiance", which perhaps explains why they have such a hard time adjusting to our benevolent guidance. There are also "strong and ancient family and tribal ties". This is an important difference, certainly. Our own ties are social and cultural; the last time they were tribal was when we liked painting ourselves blue and defecating in our civilisers' hypocausts.
Iraq's judicial system, too, will never look like Britain's. There will be "potential for abuse by officials", for one thing. For another, "where [official abuse] happens, the system will expose it not cover it up, and will strip offenders of their positions and jail them".
The minister for insurgency provocation went on, "I have already made plain the conditions under which we will hand over to the Iraqi government and security forces." Because the conditions were so plain, tonight he "set out in specific terms what those conditions are" and also "how Iraq will look when they are met." There is "confusion" on the issue, apparently. Not everyone can imagine paradise just like that.
The first condition is: "we need to see a manageable level of threat from insurgents, be they criminal or political." There was no threat from insurgents before the invasion; thirty-five months after the invasion the threat from insurgents is not manageable; and we have made significant progress.
The second condition is: "the Iraqi security forces must be more able to deal with this threat themselves". More able; now that's what I call specific - relatively speaking, of course.
The third condition is: "local government bodies need to be effective, while central government supports them", perhaps via the highly efficient infrastructure which the coalition destroyed and which the Americans recently gave up the pretence of trying to rebuild.
Finally, and most importantly, "we, ourselves, must be confident that we can provide support and backup to local forces if needed." In determining just how confident we, ourselves, have become, the views of the independent, sovereign Iraqi government will no doubt be taken into account. After all, "Our purpose has been to give Iraqis the tools to build the kind of nation they want", within reasonable limits, of course. "Our purpose in Iraq has never been to create a mirror-image of our own nation. That would never work," in fact it isn't working now, even in our own nation; and anyway, "it is not what Iraqis want". Iraqis' wants are easily comprehensible and, mirabile dictu, they are just the same as our wants: "we well understand their desire for us to leave just as soon as the conditions are right. We want that, too."
Still, the minister for armoured democratisation was forced to admit that Iraq would never "look like a western European country"; which is very likely true. There is, for example, "a different attitude to authority and allegiance", which perhaps explains why they have such a hard time adjusting to our benevolent guidance. There are also "strong and ancient family and tribal ties". This is an important difference, certainly. Our own ties are social and cultural; the last time they were tribal was when we liked painting ourselves blue and defecating in our civilisers' hypocausts.
Iraq's judicial system, too, will never look like Britain's. There will be "potential for abuse by officials", for one thing. For another, "where [official abuse] happens, the system will expose it not cover it up, and will strip offenders of their positions and jail them".
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